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the authors. In August of 1985 I cashed a check in the lobby of one of the 
largest banks  in New Orleans.  I proceeded  upstairs  to make  the 
final  payment  on  my  auto  loan,  where  a  beaming  white-haired 
gentleman carefully initialed and stamped my payment book as he had 
thirty-five  times before.  Not  fifteen  feet away  stood  the desk 
where  my  Department  Chairman  had  vouched  for  my  character  and 
prospects, and my loan had been approved with no questions asked. 
Turning to depart,  I walked past  the polished  oaken doors of the 
Trust Department.  Perhaps one day, with money to invest, I would 
gain admission to this inner sanctum. 
This story sounds oddly dated.  Yet this bank was a financial 
supermarket  that  could  meet  virtually  all  of  the  transactions, 
savings and borrowing needs of household customers throughout their 
life cycles.  One had to walk half a block to buy one's insurance, 
but this was not particularly burdensome.  With  the exception  of 
underwriting securities, the bank could and did performmost  of the 
financial services required by a wide range of business  customers 
serving the diverse economy of the Port of New Orleans. 
My New Orleans Bank has several qualities that seem outdated. 
These include the reliance on face-to-face  relationships  and the 
unsophisticated  loan-servicing  technology.  Even more  central to 
the  impression  of  quaintness,  I  believe,  is  the  lack  of 
specialization.  In  my  story,  all  the  steps  of  financial 
intermediation  from loan origination  to funding to servicing  are 
performed  in one physical  place  by  a  few people.  This  bank  is 
analogous in many ways to the old-time country  "general store". 
The bank as general store is slowly being replaced by the bank 
as  conglomerate.  This  is  happening  because  improvements  in 
information technology and market efficiency are changing the way 
the separate activities that comprise financial intermediation are performed.  The  imperatives  of cost minimization  and  competition 
are dictating that activities that once were performed together, in 
one physical place by a few people, are now performed separately by 
specialists.  In this environment  it is natural  for entrepreneurs 
to form conglomerates  of these various business units, in order to 
fulfill the role once played by the bank as general  store. 
Figure 1  illustrates the evolution of financial intermediation 
according  to this view.  Before  intermediaries  came on the scene, 
potential  lenders and borrowers  either did not trade at all  (Phase 
1) or had  to meet  face-to-face  in a double  coincidence  of wants 
(Phase  2).  The  next  stage  of  evolution  is  the  traditional 
financial intermediary of money-and-banking  textbooks--the bank as 
general  store  (Phase 3).  It performs  all the functions necessary 
to attract  funds from savers and loan the proceeds  for productive 
use.  The  current  stage  of  financial  evolution  appears  to  be 
towards  a  more  elaborate  set  of  linkages  between  borrowers  and 
lenders--the  bank as conglomerate.  By this I mean an entity that 
delivers  financial  services  through multiple  specialized  business 
units. 
In the example given here  (Phase 4), a saver deposits money in 
a  mutual  fund  or  pension  fund,  that  itself  employs  potentially 
several  firms  to perform  various  tasks.  The  fund purchases  the 
paper  of a  finance  company  that makes  an auto  loan,  and  that  in 
turn  resells  the loan  to an  issuer  of  securities  backed  by  auto 
loan  receivables.  The  borrower's  payments  are  processed  by  a 
specialized  servicer and remitted to the issuer's trustee and then 
to  the  purchasers  of  the  securities.  There  are  many  possible 
chains of intermediation  linking ultimate borrowers  with ultimate 
lenders.  The one given  in the chart is simply  to illustrate  the 
increasing  separation  of  functions,  as  compared  to  the  "general 
store" model  of banking. 
This example might not seem an appropriate illustration of the 
term "banks as conglomerates,"  since nowhere did a traditional bank 
deposit  or loan enter the picture.  Yet banking  organizations  can 
enter the chain of intermediation  not only as deposit gatherers  or 
lenders but virtually  anywhere  in the Chart: by providing  most of 
the  services  required  by  mutual  funds  and  pension  funds;  by 
affiliating  with  certain  finance  companies;  by  purchasing  or 
issuing asset-backed  securities;  and by performing  loan servicing 
operations. 
This  view  of  financial  evolution  does  not  have  obvious 
corollaries  for  bank  market  structure.  It  is  not  clear  where 
banking  organizations  will  choose  to draw  corporate  lines around 
the various  activities  for maximum  efficiency.  For example,  the 
diseconomies of managing large organizations might make "universallV 
banking organizations less efficient than organizations choosing to 
specialize  on a few activities;  but they might not.  Similarly,  it 
is impossible  to predict  how many  independent  banks  will  survive 
2 and how many will be absorbed as branches  or affiliates  of larger 
organizations. 
It is clear, however, that chains of financial intermediation 
involving multiple  links and multiple  specialists will become more 
important.  Adam  Smith  observed  that  "The division  of  labor  is 
limited  by  the  extent  of  the  market."  The  development  of  the 
elaborate  linkages  pictured  in Figure  1 requires  broad  and  deep 
financial  markets  and,  in  conjunction  with  the  appropriate 
information technology, is their byproduct.  Since neither progress 
in information  technology  nor the efficiency  of financial markets 
are  likely  to  reverse  themselves,  "the bank  as  conglomerate"  is 
likely to grow in importance. 
Banking  organizations  have  not  been  entirely  successful  in 
adapting to this process of financial evolution.  Their traditional 
deposit  and  lending  activities  have  lost  market  share  as  other 
channels of intermediation  have grown in importance.  Other parts 
of their business have not grown commensurately,  so that on balance 
banks  have  a  smaller  share  of  financial  industry  revenues  and 
capital than they did at the beginning  of the 1980s. 
Many observers of the banking industry are concerned about the 
decline  of bank market  share.  This concern takes two forms.  The 
first  relates  to  the  economic  effects  of  a  declining  role  for 
banks.  Some  argue  that  a  declining  role  for  banks  will  hinder 
economic or social objectives by making it more difficult for small 
businesses  or some individual borrowers  to obtain credit.  Others 
believe  that  as more  intermediation  is done  outside  the  deposit 
insurance  safety  net,  the  financial  system  will  become  more 
unstable.  A  related  argument  holds  that  public  funds  would 
ultimately  be used to cushion the failure of a very large nonbank 
financial  institution,  but that these nonbank  firms are not being 
charged  for this  (perceived) implicit protection  through  deposit 
insurance premiums, reserve requirements or extensive supervision. 
The  second  manifestation  of  concern  over  banks'  declining 
market share relates to the reasons for the decline.  If misguided 
and excessive  regulation  is responsible  for the decline,  there is 
an  issue  of  fairness  and  the  lack  of  'Ia  level  playing  field." 
Moreover,  there is a presumption  that changes in economic activity 
that are brought about by l~misguidedl~  regulation must by definition 
entail some misallocation  of economic  resources. 
A single paper cannot address all these issues.  My purpose in 
what follows is to address two questions.  What are the reasons for 
banks' declining market share and are further declines inevitable? 
To anticipate  the results,  I conclude that the declines  have been 
mostly  due  to market  forces, not  to regulation,  and  that  further 
3 declines--a  l'long  downward  spiral"--' are not inevitable. 
These issues should be understood in the context of the forces 
affecting  the  financial  services  industry  as a whole.  The  next 
section provides a brief survey of financial industry trends.  This 
is  followed  by  a  market-by-market  review  of  selected  banking 
activities.  The  purpose  of  these  reviews  are  to  evaluate  the 
relative  importance  of  market  forces  and  regulation  in  each 
activity.  The final section  contains conclusions. 
Financial  Services  Industry Trends 
The  financial  sector  is an  important  component  of  the U.S. 
economy, both in terms of the services it provides and in terms of 
total  employment.  The  finance  and  insurance  sector  in the U.S. 
currently employs over five million people, or almost five percent 
of the employed  workforce.  Measured  in terms of employment,  the 
sector  has  increased  in relative  importance  since  1972.  Finance 
and insurance employment as a percentage  of the employed workforce 
increased from 4.3 percent  in 1972 to 4.8 percent  in 1993, despite 
a  period  since  1988  of  essentially  zero  growth  in  the  sector's 
employment. 
The performance  of the financial services industry is closely 
tied to the performance  of the economy as a whole  (Figure 2).  Over 
the period  1970-1992,  changes  from one year to the next in market 
returns for publicly traded financial service firms track extremely 
closely the changes  in market  returns for all firms traded on the 
New York and American  stock exchanges. 
Despite  the  close  correlation  between  the  stock  returns  of 
financial firms and other firms, the asset growth of the financial 
services industry has far outstripped  the growth of the economy as 
a  whole  since  1950.  The  financial  assets  of  private  financial 
institutions  increased  from about 100 
!? 
ercent of GDP in the early 
1950s to close to 250 percent  in 1992. 
Households  were the chief engine for financial  sector growth 
during  this period  (Table 1).  While households'  financial assets 
grew at about the same rate as disposable personal  income from 1952 
through 1993, the share of their assets invested through financial 
intermediaries  increased  dramatically.  In  1952  less  than  30 
percent  of household  financial  assets  were  invested  in deposits, 
bank  trusts,  mutual  funds,  life  insurance  and  pension  reserves 
combined.  The remaining 70 percent was invested directly in stocks 
'  Barth, Brumbaugh  and Litan  (19921, Chapter  3. 
2  Emnlovment  and Earnings, U.S. Department  of Labor. 
3Flow of Funds. 
4 and  bonds  and,  especially,  equity  in noncorporate  business. 
1993 a  complete  reversal  had  occurred,  with  about  60 percent 
household  financial assets  invested through intermediaries  and 




This shift in household balance  sheets has not been entirely 
exogenous  from the standpoint  of financial  firms.  It presumably 
reflects  these  firms'  increasing  comparative  advantage  in  the 
management  of  financial  portfolios.  A  combination  of  more- 
competitive  pricing  of  financial  products,  improvements  in 
portfolio  management  and  risk  control,  and  reduced  transactions 
costs resulting  from improvements  in information  technology,  have 
all  contributed  to  an  increased  willingness  of  households  to 
entrust  the management  of their portfolios  to intermediaries.  In 
addition,  the  ability  of  employees  to  defer  taxes  on  certain 
pension  contributions  has stimulated  the rapid growth  of pension 
plan assets managed  by intermediaries. 
The  growth  of  attractive  vehicles  for  household  portfolio 
management  is symptomatic  of an underlying  increase in competition 
in financial services.  The increased volatility  of interest rates 
in the late 197Os, the l'unbundlingl'  of financial services described 
in the introduction,  and certain regulatory  changes, encouraged  a 
sharp  increase  in  price  competition  that  required  difficult 
adjustments  for traditional  financial intermediaries,  and not just 
banks. 
Because  of  this  increased  price  competition,  traditional 
financial intermediaries  to some extent shared a common experience 
from the late  1970s through  the early  1990s: market  pressures  on 
traditional  lines of business,  rapid expansion into new activities 
and  subsequent  difficulties  and  contraction.  The  most  extreme 
example  of  this  pattern  involves  the  experience  of  the  thrift 
industry, a story that has been well told elsewhere and need not be 
repeated.  In many  respects,  the causes and nature of the savings 
and loan crisis cannot be generalized  to other industries.  Yet in 
broad  outline  the same pattern  was  repeated  in less extreme  form 
for other financial  intermediaries  during  the 1980s.  In order to 
emphasize  that  depository  institutions  were  not  the  only  firms 
affected  by  these  market  forces,  it  will  be  useful  to  review 
briefly  the  experience  of  the  life  insurance  and  securities 
industries. 
The  life  insurance  industry  enjoyed  a  prolonged  period  of 
stability and relative prosperity throughout much of the post-World 
War  II period.  Insurers  generally  held  relatively  conservative 
portfolios  of long-term assets.  These were well suited to match a 
stable  structure  of  mostly  long-term  liabilities  arising  from 
insurance policies  and annuities.  Low and stable market  interest 
rates  for  the most  part  discouraged  customers  from  shopping  for 
yields  from other financial providers. 
5 With the increasing inflation and interest rates of the 197Os, 
the life insurance  industry began experiencing  disintermediation. 
As market  interest  rates rose, policy holders  in search of higher 
yields cashed out or exercised their option to obtain policy loans 
at relatively  low regulated  rates.  The liquidity problems  became 
particularly  acute as the 1980s began, when the search for higher 
yields  caused some pension  funds to turn away from life insurance 
companies  as fund managers.4 
As a result  of these episodes  of disintermediation  the life 
insurance  industry  began  to  offer  new  liability  products. 
Universal  life,  variable  life  and  other  new  types  of  insurance 
policies essentially unbundled  the provision of insurance from the 
investment  vehicle,  and provided  a market  return  on  investment.5 
This  unbundling  of  functions  was  instrumental  in  forcing  life 
insurers  into  an  era  of  increased  price  competition  on  the 
liability  side. 
As the cost of attracting  life insurance policies  increased, 
insurers  placed  growing  reliance  on  the  pension  business.  To 
attract funds from institutional investors, life insurers developed 
the guaranteed investment contract  (GIG),  an instrument that allows 
investors the opportunity  to invest funds at a contracted rate for 
a specified time.  Life insurance companies' pension reserves as a 
fraction of life insurance  reserves  rose from 25 percent  in 1955, 
to 90 percent in 1980, 
1992.6 
to 220 percent of life insurance reserves by 
This changing mix reduced the importance of the traditional 
revenue  source,  life  insurance  premiums.  In 1965 life  insurance 
premiums  outweighed  annuity  considerations  by more  than seven-to- 
one  as  a  revenue  source  for  the  industry.  By  1980  the gap  had 
closed  to  less  than  two-to-one,  and  as  of  1991  annuity 
considerations  exceeded  life  insurance  premiums  by  more  than  50 
percent.' 
The new liability products were accompanied by changes on the 
asset  side  of  the  balance  sheet.  Maturities  of  assets  were 
shortened to more closely match the maturities  of the increasingly 
interest-sensitive  liabilities.  To satisfy  pressures  for higher 
yields,  riskier  assets  were  put  on  the  books  and  rapid  growth 
ensued: the assets of the life insurance industry grew at a rate of 
almost 12 percent per year from the beginning  of the 1980s through 
4  Wright  (19911, p. 98. 
5  For further details  see Wright  (1991), p. 80-83. 
6  Flow of Funds, Table L.122. 
7  American  Council of Life Insurance  (1992), p. 69 
6 year-end  1987.8 
In  short,  many  life  insurance  firms  transformed  themselves 
from  managers  of  mortality  and  morbidity  risk  into  managers  of 
investment  risk  in  a  short  time.'  It  is  not  surprising  in 
hindsight  that the real-estate  recession of the late 1980s and the 
collapse  of the junk bond market  in 1990 revealed  that many  firms 
were  overextended.  As  illustrated  in  Figure  3,  life  insurance 
companies  were  failing  at  a  higher  rate  than  commercial  banks 
during  the period  1989-1991." 
The securities industry also experienced pressures on its core 
businesses.  Traditionally,  the  major  source  of  revenue  for 
securities  firms was  commissions  on securities  trades.  The  New 
York  Stock  Exchange  had  for many  years  required  its members  to 
charge  fixed  minimum  commissions  for  stock  transactions.  This 
arrangement  had been exempted from prosecution  under the antitrust 
laws  by  the  Securities  Exchange  Act  of  1934."  Fixed-rate 
commissions were analogous to the limits on the interest rates that 
banks  and thrifts  could pay on deposits;  both were  sanctioned  by 
Depression-era  legislation  in an  attempt  to prevent  destructive 
competitive  practices  in  their  respective  industries.  The 
Securities  Acts  Amendments  of  1975  ended  the  era  of  fixed-rate 
commissions.  On May  1, 1975  (remembered in the industry  as  'IMay 
Day"'*)  commissions  on equity transactions  became negotiable. 
Another  important  revenue  source  was  income  from  the 
underwriting  of  securities.  The  disclosure  requirements  for 
publicly  traded securities  in the United  States made  the issuance 
of  these  securities  a  labor-intensive  process.  In  addition  to 
earning an underwriting  spread representing  the difference between 
the offering price of the security to the public and the proceeds 
to the issuer, investment banks could add value by assisting  in the 
extensive  due  diligence  activities  necessary  to  prepare  a 
prospectus  that would  be  acceptable  to  the SEC  and by  providing 
advice regarding the structure and pricing of the securities.  All 
of these areas have come under pressure. 
In part  in response  to an  increasing  flow  of new  issues  to 
offshore  markets,  the SEC attempted  to reduce  the cost of public 
issuance of securities  in the U.S.  In March,  1982, SEC Rule 415, 
a  American  Council  of Life Insurance  (1992) p. 85. 
9  Lennon  (1991), p. 98. 
lo  Colantuoni  (1993). 
l1  Gart  (1994), p. 45. 
'*  Marshall  and Ellis, p-16. 
7 more  commonly known as shelf registration,  was implemented.  In a 
shelf registration, an SEC filing for the issuance of securities is 
good  for up  to  two  years  after  the  date  of  the  initial  filing. 
Thus, the required due diligence  investigation and filing of forms 
need  only  be  done  once.  After  that,  the  issuer  can  use  the 
authority  to issue securities  on only 24 hours notice  to the SEC, 
and on multiple  occasions during the two years, simply by amending 
the registration  to reflect changes in the firm's condition.  This 
contrasts with the old approach in which firms had to complete the 
full registration  process  for every issue, and the securities  had 
to be distributed very quickly after SEC approval.  For large firms 
that access the capital markets frequently, shelf registration  has 
become  the preferred  method  of issuing securities.13 
Shelf registration has been a factor in reducing underwriting 
spreads.  Traditionally  a business  firm would have a relationship 
with  an  investment  bank  in which  the  entire  process  of  issuing 
securities--preparation  of the issue, the underwriting  itself, and 
distribution  to the public--would  be managed  by  that bank.  With 
the advent of shelf registration  it has become increasingly  common 
for  the  issuing  firm  to  solicit  competitive  bids  for  the 
underwriting,  once  the initial preparation  of documents  has been 
completed.  This unbundling  of functions has put downward pressure 
on underwriting  spreads. 
The  growth  of  foreign  competition  and  competition  from  the 
treasury departments  of large nonfinancial  corporations  also have 
played  important  roles  in making  the underwriting  business  more 
competitive.  It  is  becoming  increasingly  common  for  large 
nonfinancial  corporations  to issue  simple  securities  themselves, 
without  the assistance  of an investment banker. 
These competitive pressures have resulted in a decline in the 
importance  of  securities  firms'  traditional  revenue  sources. 
Commissions  on  securities  transactions,  which  had  accounted  for 
over  50  percent  of  broker-dealer  revenue  in  the  mid-1970s14 
declined  to 34 percent  of revenue  in 1980 and 18 percent  in 1993. 
Throughout  the 198Os, securities  firms placed growing  reliance  on 
"other income" as a revenue source, especially  advising  fees from 
mergers  and  acquisitions  (M&A)  and  corporate  restructurings. 
"Other income" increased from 20 percent of broker-dealer  revenues 
in 1980 to 39 percent  in 1992. 
Fueled by growing M&A activity,  the rapid growth of the junk 
bond business and the bull market  in stocks, securities  firms grew 
rapidly during the 1980s.  From 1980 to 1986, the assets of broker 
l3  This discussion is drawn fromMarshal  and Ellis, pp.77-78. 
I4  NY  Fed  (19931,  Charts  following  p.  204.  and  SEC  Annual 
Report data. 
8 dealers registered with the SEC increased at an average annual rate 
of 28 percent.  With the stock market corrections of 1987 and 1989, 
the collapse of the junk bond market  in 1990 and the recession  of 
the  early  199os,  however,  some  securities  firms  experienced 
difficulties.  Drexel,  Burnham  Lambert  filed  for  bankruptcy 
protection  in  1990.  The  difficulties  of  some  other  large  firms 
were  resolved  less disruptively.  American  Express  recapitalized 
Shearson-Lehman,  General  Electric  provided  support  to  Kidder 
Peabody,  Prudential  Insurance  restructured  Prudential  Bathe,  and 
Credit Suisse recapitalized  First Boston."  In addition,  there was 
substantial  consolidation  among  smaller  securities  firms.  The 
number of broker-dealers  registered with the SEC declined by 1722, 
or 18 percent,  between year-end  1987 and year-end  1992.16 
In short,  interest-rate  volatility,  unbundling  of  financial 
activities,  and  regulatory  removal  of  certain  barriers  to 
competition  led  to  increased  price  competition  in  the  core 
businesses  of both life insurers and securities firms.  Many firms 
grew  rapidly  into new  lines of business,  and many  did not manage 
the transition well.  The success of commercial banks  in adapting 
to this new environment  is discussed  in the next section. 
Commercial  Bank Performance 
The experience  of the commercial banking  industry during  the 
last ten to 20 years is similar in many respects to the experiences 
of  the  thrift  industry,  the  life  insurance  industry  and  the 
securities  industry.  Traditional  core  businesses  came  under 
competitive  pressure,  and the industry began  to increase reliance 
on activities  such as lending to Less Developed  Countries  (LDCs), 
commercial  real  estate  lending,  and  a variety  of  fee-based  off- 
balance  sheet  activities.  In  LDC  lending,  in  agricultural  and 
energy lending, and in commercial real-estate lending there was an 
abrupt  reckoning  as  markets  plummeted  in  areas  where  banks  had 
heavy  exposures.  More  than  1300 banks  failed  from  1985  through 
1992. 
Like the life insurance and securities industries, commercial 
banks  have  experienced  a period  of consolidation.  The number  of 
insured  commercial  banks  and  trusts  declined  by  3450,  or  24 
percent,  from  1985  through  1993.  The  number  of  banking 
organizations  declined by 2719, again 24 percent,  during the same 
period  (Table  2).  Concentration  increased,  as  the  largest 
organizations  garnered a bigger share of industry assets.  The top 
50 banking  organizations  increased  their share of industry assets 
from about 52 percent at year-end 1985 to about 62 percent at year- 
end 1993. 
l5  Gart,  1994, p. 76. 
“SEC Annual  Report data. 
9 The short-term prospects  for the commercial banking  industry 
are excellent as of this writing.  1993 earnings of $43 billion far 
surpassed  the  1992  record  of  $32 billion.  Noncurrent  loans  and 
real-estate owned have declined to their lowest dollar volume since 
1986.  The  industry's  year-end  1993  weighted  average  equity 
capital-to-assets 
1963.17 
ratio  of  eight  percent  is  the  highest  since 
Despite  these  favorable  indicators,  many  observers  remain 
concerned  about  the  long-term  health  of  the  banking  industry. 
Commercial banks' share of financial intermediation  is declining by 
several measures.  For example,  the commercial  bank  share  of the 
financial assets of all private financial institutions fell from 45 
percent  in the 1950s to 35 percent  in the 1960s and  197Os,  to 25 
percent  in recent years  (Table 3). 
Before proceeding with a discussion of the reasons for banks' 
declining  market  share,  it  will  be  useful  to  examine  briefly 
whether this decline is real, or is simply an artifact of incorrect 
measures  of market share.  Since banks are choosing to concentrate 
more on off-balance  sheet activities, a definition  of market share 
that  focuses  on  shares  of  financial  assets  on  the  books  may  be 
missing  the mark. 
One way to evaluate  this argument  is by looking at the trend 
in bank  revenues  as a fraction  of the total revenues  of banking, 
securities  and life  insurance  firms.  Commercial  banks'  share of 
total  revenues  declined  from 56 percent  in 1980 to 44 percent  in 
1992.18  It could be argued  that bank  revenues  are largely  driven 
by the level of interest  rates, which  have declined  considerably 
since  1980.  However,  similar  conclusions  are  drawn  from  other 
measures.  For  example,  securities'  firms  pre-tax  net  income 
increased at an average  rate of 9.2 percent per year between  1980 
and  1992  (data on  net  income  for  life  insurers  is  not  readily 
available, and in any event is not comparable because of accounting 
differences),  compared  to  6.6  percent  per  year  for  banks. 
Similarly,  the  share  of  book  capital  in  commercial  banking, 
relative  to  insurance,  securities  firms  and  finance  companies, 
declined  from 54 percent  in the mid-1970s  to 43 percent  recently 
(Table 4). 
It is important to note that these results apply to commercial 
banks  and  do not  include  revenues  and  capital  deriving  from  the 
nonbanking  activities  of bank holding companies.  While in my view 
it is likely  that  the  same qualitative  results  would  hold  if we 
looked at banking organizations  rather than banks, this is open to 
further investigation. 
17FDIC  Quarterly  Banking  Profile,  Fourth Quarter  1993. 
'*  ACLI  (1992), SEC Annual  Report data and FDIC  (1993). 
10 In  short,  it  appears  that  banks  have  not  been  completely 
successful in adapting to changes in financial markets.  While they 
have  lost  market  share  in  traditional  activities,  as  described 
below,  they  do  not  appear  to  have  increased  their  share 
commensurately  in emerging  businesses.  The  next  section  of  the 
paper  will  survey  the  changing  role  of  banks  in  a  number  of 
activities  closely related to fund gathering  and lending: deposit 
gathering, pension fund management and mutual fund sales, household 
lending, business  lending and securities underwriting.  It is only 
by  taking a detailed  look at specific  banking  activities  that we 
can  make  an  informed  judgment  on  the  relative  importance  of 
regulation and market  forces in driving the changes in bank market 
share. 
Commercial  Bank Activities 
Deposit Gatherinq 
It is important  to distinguish  between banks' deposit market 
share  -- the portion  of household  assets  invested  in deposits  -- 
and  banks'  overall  share  of  household  assets,  including  trust 
assets,  mutual  funds  and  pension  funds under  management.  Banks 
have  lost market  share  in both  areas, but  for different  reasons. 
This section  focuses on deposit gathering. 
Banks  have  lost  deposit  market  share  primarily  to  mutual 
funds, which  increasingly  have offered some payment  services,  and 
pension  funds,  which  have  benefitted  enormously  from  the  tax- 
deferred treatment of certain pension contributions.  Primarily as 
a  result  of  this  competition,  the  share  of  household  assets 
invested in deposits  fell from about 25 percent during most of the 
1970s  to  about  17 percent  by  1993  (Table 5).  During  the  same 
period,  the  combined  share  of mutual  funds and  pension  funds  in 
attracting  household savings almost tripled, from 13 percent to 35 
percent. 
The  increased  alternatives  available  to  savers  have  had  a 
major  effect  on banks'  funding  costs.  As  indicated  in Figure  4, 
the average interest cost of deposits has increased inexorably over 
the  last  20 years,  when  measured  relative  to the yields  on U.S. 
Treasury  debt.  In 1970, banks' average  interest expense was only 
35 percent  of the yield  on 91-day  Treasury  bills.  In 1992,  the 
lines crossed  for the first time, as banks paid more  for funds on 
average  than the Treasury-bill  rate. 
The increased cost of deposits most likely played an important 
role in constraining the growth of the banking industry during this 
period.  An  increased cost of doing business  reduces the return on 
invested  capital, other things constant,  inhibiting  the growth  of 
new capital and hence the asset growth of the industry. 
11 It  has  been  asserted  by  some  observers  that  the  banking 
industry's "brick andmortar"  branch network for gathering deposits 
has become economically inefficient.  In this view, improvements in 
technology have made it increasingly unnecessary  for a customer to 
set foot in a branch.  Therefore,  it is argued,  firms that conduct 
business  by  telephone,  ATMs  and  electronic  transfer  have  a  cost 
advantage  in  fund  gathering  as  compared  to  the  traditional 
commercial  bank. 
While  this view  is plausible,  it is difficult  to reconcile 
with the fact that the number of branches  (not including ATMs)  of 
U.S.  commercial  banks  has increased  since  1985  (Table 2).  It is 
likely  that  improvements  in  technology  have  made  it possible  to 
operate  branches  with  fewer,  more  productive  personnel  and  with 
less space required for storage of records.  Thus, it is not clear 
a oriori how improvements  in technology have altered  the relative 
benefits  and costs of opening a new branch. 
Banks enjoy certain artificial advantages  in gathering  funds. 
One of these is federal deposit  insurance.  Another  is the barrier 
to  entry  to  the  deposit-taking  business  erected  by  the  Glass- 
Steagall  Act.  While  mutual  funds  are  increasingly  offering 
transactions  services, Glass-Steagall  prevents  them from offering 
a full-service  deposit  business.  Still another  advantage  is the 
ability  to provide  their customers  indirect access  to the Federal 
Reserve's  Fedwire  system.  Fedwire provides  instantaneous,  real- 
time final settlement of large payments, and is currently available 
only to depository  institutions. 
There are two areas where it might be argued that banks suffer 
a  disadvantage  in  fund  gathering.  First,  constraints  on  their 
asset portfolios may make it hard for banks to offer the same risk- 
return characteristics  as an equity fund or aggressive  bond  fund. 
In principle,  however,  there  is no reason  customers  seeking  such 
return  characteristics  cannot  be  accommodated  by  the  trust 
department or through the mutual fund authority available to banks. 
Second,  the  inability  to  branch  or  merge  in  some  cases  can 
artificially  increase  the  all-in  cost  of  deposit  gathering  by 
preventing  the elimination  of redundant back-office  capacity. 
Meaningful  comparisons  of  the  cost  of  funds  to  banks  as 
compared  to  other  intermediaries  are  difficult,  since  one  must 
control for differences in asset  portfolios, capitalization levels, 
regulation,  and  the  presence  of  federal  deposit  insurance.  On 
balance, however,  it is hard to argue that banks suffer regulatory 
handicaps in the fund-gathering business.  The industry enjoys some 
important  built-in  advantages:  deposit  insurance,  Glass-Steagall 
protections  from  competition  and  access  to  the payments  system. 
The growing number of bank branches suggests that these advantages 
still outweigh  the additional  costs of the branch network. 
Pension Funds and Mutual  Funds 
12 The  growth  of  pension  funds  and  mutual  funds  is  a  prime 
example  of  the  increasing  separation  of  functions  in  financial 
services.  These entities provide savers with specialized portfolio 
management,  a menu of risk-return characteristics,  and easy access 
to account information.  There is no reason why such services must 
be provided  by the same entity  that, say, originates  or services 
loans. 
Mutual funds have grown rapidly over the past ten years.  They 
have the advantage  of enabling  small savers to participate  in the 
returns  from a diversified  portfolio  of securities,  and  to chose 
from  a  menu  of  risk-return  characteristics.  Many  mutual  funds 
offer transactions privileges  as well, increasing their ability to 
compete  with  bank  deposits.  As  a  share  of  household  financial 
assets, mutual  funds increased  from about two percent  in the late 
1970s to about eight percent  recently  (Table 5). 
Generally,  mutual  funds  do  not  have  direct  employees. 
Instead,  the  Boards  of  Directors  contract  with  other  firms  to 
fulfill various roles: underwriter;  investment advisor; custodian; 
transfer agent; administrator;  fund accountant;  fund counsel; and 
independent auditor.  Most of these roles can be performed by banks 
without  regulatory  obstacles.  Through  their  trust  departments, 
banks have historically  performed  custodial  services and transfer 
agent  services  for  a  variety  of  firms  including  mutual  funds. 
Custodians hold the securities purchased by the fund, and purchase 
or sell securities  in the proportion  determined  by the investment 
advisor.  The  transfer  agent  maintains  records  of  the  shares  of 
each investor  in the fund and the disposition  of returns on their 
investments.  Banks  can  serve  as  administrators  --  essentially 
business  managers  --  of  mutual  funds.  The  fund  accountant  is 
required to track per share net asset values on a daily basis, and 
conform  to  other  requirements  of  the  Investment  Company  Act  of 
1940.  While there are no regulatory barriers  for banks wishing  to 
provide  this  service,  developing  the  necessary  expertise  and 
systems requires a significant  initial investment before a bank is 
prepared  to offer this service to a mutual  fund.19 The investment 
advisor  decides  what  securities  to buy and sell,  consistent  with 
the investment objectives established by the Board, and earns fees 
that are normally based on some percentage  of the net asset value 
of the fund.  Providing  investment  advice  to a large  fund can be 
very lucrative.  National banks are permitted  to act as investment 
advisers to mutual  funds under the National Bank Act.  State banks 
are bound by state laws, but both the FDIC and the Federal Reserve 
permit  this activity. 
The  underwriter,  also  called  the  sponsor  or  distributor, 
effects  the  funds'  share  transactions.  Thus,  when  an  investor 
wants to buy shares, the underwriter  purchases  the shares from the 
l9  American  Bankers Association,  p.4. 
13 fund and sells them to the investor, taking technical ownership of 
the shares for an instant in time.  The load or sales commission, 
if  any,  accrues  to  the  underwriter.  National  banks  and  state 
member banks are not permitted to underwrite mutual fund shares for 
the same reason they cannot underwrite corporate securities issues: 
both are bank-ineligible  securities under the Glass-Steagall  Act.*' 
Banks  can distribute  mutual  fund shares in three ways.  In a 
proprietary  fund,  the bank  serves  as  the  investment  adviser  and 
hires an unaffiliated  entity as the underwriter.  At year-end 1993, 
113 banks  or bank  subsidiaries  offered  proprietary  funds.  In a 
private  label arrangement,  a third party contracts with a bank to 
set up a mutual  fund that is named by the bank.  The bank gets a 
"house brand"  mutual  fund  it  can market  to  its  customers  while 
having  the  investment  advice  and  other  functions  performed  by 
others.  Finally,  a bank  can simply act as a broker,  selling  the 
mutual  fund of a third party  on the bank  premises.  It has been 
estimated  that over 3000 banks  are selling mutual  fund shares  in 
one of these forms.*l 
Banks'  share  of  the  mutual  fund  business  is  modest  but 
growing.  The market  share of proprietary  bank  funds doubled  from 
year-end  1988  to  mid-1993,  from  5.4  percent  to  10.8  percent. 
Growth  in advisor and administrator  revenues  for these funds more 
than tripled  during  this period.**  According  to a recent  survey, 
33 percent  of all mutual  funds had sales through banks during  the 
first half of 1992.23 Recently,  regulators have expressed  concern 
that investors purchasing mutual  funds from banks may be confusing 
these  products  with  insured  deposits.  It  remains  to  be  seen 
whether  these  concerns  will  constrain  the growth  of bank  mutual 
funds. 
Pension  funds  have  been  the  fastest  growing  repository  for 
household  savings  in  recent  years.  Pension  funds'  share  of 
household  assets  grew  from  10 percent  as  the  1970s  began  to  27 
percent  recently.  One of the most  important  reasons  for this is 
the tax-deferred  status of certain pension  fund contributions  and 
the increasingly  common practice  of employers'  providing  matching 
tax-deferred  contributions  to employee pension plans. 
*'  State nonmember  banks  can underwrite  mutual  fund shares if 
permitted  by state  law and the FDIC.  As of March  1994, one such 
bank  had  received  FDIC  permission  to  engage  in  this  activity 
through a subsidiary. 
*’  ABA, 
**These 
23  ABA, 
P-9 
figures are from Lipper Analytical  Services. 
Investment  Company  Institute 
14 The management  of pension  fund assets is a highly competitive 
business.  Indicative of this competitive spirit are the reports on 
the  industry's  "biggest  winners"  and  "biggest  losers,"  together 
with lists of accounts gained and lost by the major players in this 
market,  that appear  regularly  in Institutional  Investor magazine. 
Bank  trust departments  once played  the dominant  role in managing 
pension  fund assets, but have lost that position. 
The only quantitative  indicator of banks' pension management 
business  is  contained  in  the  annual  report  Trust  Assets  of 
Financial Institutions published  since 1968 by the bank regulatory 
agencies.  The  report  contains  data  on  the volume  of  assets  in 
employee benefit plan accounts managed by trust departments.  These 
accounts  include  retirement  plans,  health  insurance  accounts  and 
other  employee  benefit  plans.  For  purposes  of measuring  bank 
market share in pension management these data are far from perfect. 
Nevertheless,  changes over time in this series compared to changes 
in total pension  assets  should be  indicative  of the direction  of 
change  in bank  market  share.  Assets  in  employee  benefit  plans 
managed by bank trusts were 43 percent of total pension fund assets 
in 1968.  By 1992, that percentage had fallen to 17 percent  (Figure 
5). 
Banks  do  not  face  any  special  regulatory  hurdles  in  the 
pension  management  business.  Their  loss of market  share  in this 
area has been attributed  to a failure to compete with mutual  fund 
companies  in the areas  of communication  and  consumer  education.B 
These firms were accustomed to providing customers with twenty-four 
hour,  seven  day  per  week  800-number  service,  daily  updating  of 
account  balances,  regular  mailings  of  account  information  and 
consumer education  on basic  concepts of investment planning. 
Household  Lendinq 
The  main  types  of  bank  lending  to  households  are  mortgage 
lending and consumer  credit.  This has been a growth business  for 
financial intermediaries  in general, as household debt has expanded 
relative to disposable personal  income for many years  (Table 6). 
Mortsase Lendinq. Mortgage debt is by  far the predominant  form 
of  household  debt,  accounting  for  69  percent  of  all  household 
liabilities as of year-end 1992.  For most mortgages,  the days when 
a single institution originates the loan, holds it in portfolio and 
services it over its life are over: it is estimated that 63 percent 
by  dollar  volume  of  all  home  mortgages  originated  in  1993, 
including 46 percent of lljumbos,ll  were securitized."  Origination, 
funding and servicing are separate activities and each is performed 
24  Holliday,  1992, p. 60. 
25  Inside Mortgage  Finance  (1994) p. 140. 
15 in highly  competitive  markets. 
The last ten years have seen a slight increase  in commercial 
banks'  share  of  long-term  l-4  family  mortgage  originations  as 
reported  by  the U.S. Department  of Housing  and Urban  Development 
(Table 7).  Unfortunately,  these data both understate  the share of 
banking organizations and provide no information about the trend of 
their market share, since mortgage  companies affiliated with banks 
are  not  separated  from  other  mortgage  companies.  A  different 
picture  is  revealed  by  inspection  of  the  shares  of  the  top  25 
mortgage  originators,  as reported by Inside Mortsase  Finance.  In 
1989,  17 of the top 25 mortgage  originators  were  affiliated  with 
banks or thrifts, and these institutions  originated  77 percent by 
dollar volume, of the originations of the top 25.  By 1993, only 14 
of the top 25 were bank- or thrift-related  firms, and these firms 
originated  49 percent,  by  dollar,  of  the  top  25's  originations. 
Clearly  the  large  independent  mortgage  originators  were  making 
inroads. 
The  business  of  funding  mortgages  in  portfolio  has  been 
drastically  changed by the growth of federally  sponsored mortgage 
pools.  By vastly  increasing  the demand  for conforming mortgages, 
federal  involvement  has  driven  up  the  market  value  of  these 
instruments  and  reduced  their  yields.  In  conjunction  with 
depository institutions' increasing cost of funds, the ready market 
for conforming mortgages  has encouraged these institutions  to sell 
rather than hold mortgages.  Since the beginning  of the 197Os, the 
share  of  residential  mortgage  debt  held  in  federally  sponsored 
pools has increased from one percent to 43 percent, while the share 
of commercial banks has remained fairly steady in the 15-18  percent 
range. 
Mortgage  servicing is a highly competitive business with many 
firms.  The  largest  firms  have  gradually  increased  their market 
share  over  the  last  four  years.  The  top  25 mortgage  servicers 
increased  their  share of the servicing  market  from 18 percent  at 
year-end  1989 to 31  percent  at year-end  199326. The share of this 
business  done by banks and thrifts has increased.  In 1989, 14 of 
the  top  25 mortgage  servicers  were  bank-  or  thrift-related,  and 
these  firms  serviced  59  percent  of  the  business  of  the  top  25 
firms.  By 1993, the bank and thrift servicers had increased their 
share to 17 of the top 25, with 64 percent of the group's business. 
All home mortgage  lenders must comply with the provisions  of 
the Real  Estate  Settlement  Procedures  Act  of  1974,  the Truth  in 
Lending Act of 1968 and subsequent revisions, and the Equal Credit 
Opportunity  Act  of  1975.  These  statutes  are  intended  to  insure 
adequate disclosure of the costs and terms of mortgage lending, and 
to  prevent  discrimination  based  on  race,  religion  or  other 
26  Inside Mortsase  Finance,  Feb. 25, 1994, p.6. 
16 prohibited  factors.  The  Home  Mortgage  Disclosure  Act  of  1975 
(HMDA) requires mortgage-lending  institutions with assets over $10 
million,  and a home or branch office in a Metropolitan  Statistical 
Area,  to  compile  and  disclose  data  about  their  mortgage 
applications  and  rnortgqqe  loans  and  purchases,  itemized  by 
geographic area and year.  The Community Reinvestment  Act of 1977 
(CRA) applies  to all banking  services, not just mortgage  lending. 
It  requires  the  federal  banking  agencies  to  evaluate  insured 
institutions'  records  of  meeting  the  credit  needs  of  their 
communities,  and  take  this  record  into  account  in  evaluating 
applications  for  deposit  facilities  (e.g., branching,  merger  or 
relocation).  Finally, the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery 
and Enforcement Act of 1989 requires federally insured depositories 
to obtain  independent  and  impartially  prepared  appraisals  on all 
real-estate  transactions  above  a  minimum  amount  established  by 
regulation.  In  1992  this  minimum  was  increased  by  the  bank 
regulatory  agencies  from $50,000 to $100,000.28 
There  are  thus two special  regulatory  requirements  faced by 
banks,  but not by nonbanks,  in home mortgage  lending.  One  is to 
maintain  records  of  loan  applications  and  outcomes  for  CRA 
purposes,  and  the  other  is to obtain  independent  appraisals  for 
certain  loans.  In evaluating  the  competitive  burden  imposed  by 
these  requirements,  it  should  be  noted  that  nonbank  originators 
compete with banks almost exclusively  in the market  for loans that 
are securitized.  Such loans require an appraisal  anyway, as well 
as a certain amount of documentation.  And while the relative cost 
of  documentation  is an  empirical  question,  the  origination  data 
discussed above suggests that the commercial banking  industry as a 
whole has at least maintained  its market  share in this area. 
Consumer Credit. Banks' share of consumer credit has declined 
from  about  51 percent  throughout  most  of  the  1970s  to  about  45 
percent  in  1993  (Table 8).  Finance  companies'  share  fell  even 
more, from 24 percent as the 1970s began to less than 15 percent  in 
1993.  This  combined  loss of 15 percentage  points  is essentially 
explained by the development  in the mid-1980s  of securities backed 
by  pools  of  consumer  loans,  mostly  credit  card  receivables  and 
automobile loans.  Issuers of asset-backed securities  CABS)  held 15 
percent  of consumer  credit outstanding  at year-end  1993. 
The  "conventional wisdom"  that finance companies have gained 
market share in consumer credit thus depends on the assumption that 
the growing  pool  of asset backed  securities  are backed  mostly  by 
finance company receivables,  rather than bank receivables.  These 
27Federal Financial  Institutions  Examination  Council,  1992, 
p.l. 
28  For further discussion  see GAO  (1993). 
17 securities are backed primarily by auto loan receivables and credit 
card receivables  originated by both banks and nonbanks.  Adequate 
data on ABS issuers' holdings do not exist to determine the overall 
share of consumer  credit provided by banks. 
Credit  cards  are  an  important  method  of  extending  consumer 
credit, and banks have traditionally dominated the business.  "Bank 
cards,11  cards  which  may  be used  for purchases  from any  retailer 
whose  depository  institution  is  part  of  the  cards'  settlement 
system, are the most widely used  form of credit card.  Entry into 
the  bank  card  issuance  business  is  effectively  limited  to 
depository  institutions.  First, only depository  institutions  are 
allowed  to participate  in the systems  which  have  been  set up  by 
Visa  and Mastercard  to  settle  interbank  accounts.  Second,  both 
national  and  state  chartered  depository  institutions  are able  to 
"export" the interest rates allowed by the usury laws of the state 
in  which  the  national  institution  is  located  or  the  state 
institution  is chartered to borrowers  in other states.29 Thus, for 
example,  a  commercial  firm  without  an  affiliation  to  a  state- 
chartered  depository  institution  would  be  bound  by  the  separate 
usury  laws  of  each  of  the  states  in  which  it  had  borrowers.30 
Finally, the practical  requirements  of processing payments make it 
extremely  useful  for  credit  card  issuers  to  have  access  to  the 
Fedwire payments  system. 
A commercial  firm can enter the credit card business  through 
the creation  or acquisition  of limited purpose  credit  card banks 
under an exception created by the Competitive  Equality Banking Act 
of  1987  (CEBA) to the general  prohibition  of  such  ownership  set 
forth in the Bank Holding Company Act  (BHCA).  Commercial firms are 
allowed  to own limited purpose  credit card banks because  the CEBA 
has excepted  such  institutions  from the definition  of  llbankll  for 
purposes  of  the BHCA.  Alternatively,  a number  of nonbank  firms 
have been  able  to issue  cards  through  state-chartered  industrial 
loan companies  (ILCs) -- the so-called "nonbank banks."  These card 
issuers  include  Sears,  GMAC  and  AT&T.  The  growth  in  new  ILC 
charters for nonbanks was abruptly curtailed in 1987 by the CEBA.31 
29  National banks have this power as a result of Supreme Court 
decisions  (See Marouette  National  Bank v.  First  of Omaha  Service 
Corooration,  439 U.S. 299  (1978)); state banks have the authority 
pursuant to section 521 of the Depository Institutions Deregulation 
and Monetary  Control Act of 1980  (12 U.S.C.  5 1831d). 
3o  The  author  is  indebted  to Mark  Mellon  of  the  FDIC  Legal 
Division  for  providing  detailed  technical  information  about  the 
credit card business. 
31  CEBA 
California, 
and thereby 
in effect  stipulated  that  ILCs  in states  other  than 
Utah and Colorado had to become bank holding companies 
be subject to regulation by the Federal Reserve.  Only 
18 Cards  issued  by  nonbank  firms  are  gaining  market  share,  at 
least as measured  by the top ten issuers.  In 1988, two of the top 
ten card issuers were affiliated  with commercial  firms, and these 
two had 16 percent  of the outstanding  card receivables  of the top 
ten.  By  1992,  four nonbank  firms were  in the  top ten and  their 
share of the groups'  receivables  had doubled  to 32 percent.32 
The credit card business  has traditionally  been dominated  by 
banks  and  it  cannot  be  said  that  they  suffer  any  regulatory 
handicaps  in this area as compared to nonbank institutions.  It is 
true that the inability to affiliate with commercial firms prevents 
banks from offering an arrangement  in which users of a card issued 
by  a  commercial  firm  can get  discounts  on  that  firm's  products. 
Nevertheless,  bank card issuers can and do offer their cardholders 
a  variety  of  promotions  and  discounts  through  participating 
merchants. 
There  are  certain  types  of  consumer  credit  where  banks' 
inability  to affiliate  with commercial  firms most  likely does put 
them  at  a  competitive  disadvantage.  Auto  finance  companies  are 
prime  examples  of nonbank  firms  that have  captured  a substantial 
share of a specific market.  Their  success presumably  reflects  a 
number of factors.  First is their ability  to allow the customers 
of the parent company to economize on time and I'shoe  leather costs" 
in  obtaining  financing.  Second  is  their  affiliation  with 
organizations  that have specialized  expertise  in disposing  of the 
collateral  (the automobile)  in the event of default.  Finally, the 
tie-in between  the extension of credit and the sale of the product 
may  enable  these  organizations  to  offer  a  menu  of  options  with 
regard  to  the  auto  sales  price,  down  payment  and  loan  interest 
rate.  By allowing  customers  of differing  financial  circumstances 
to select  the option most  suitable  to themselves,  sales  revenues 
can be increased. 
Business  Lendinq 
An inclusive measure  of bank lending to business33  shows bank 
loans as a proportion  of nonfinancial  business  sector liabilities 
increasing from an average of 19 percent in the 1950s to an average 
California  still issues new ILC charters. 
32  Credit Card Management,  May issues. 
33  This measure includes an estimated share of mortgage lending 
provided  by banks  to nonfinancial  business  as well as  "bank loans 
not  elsewhere  classified."  For  each  type  of  mortgage  (home, 
multifamily,  commercial  and  farm) used  by nonfinancial  business, 
the share provided  by banks  is assumed  to equal  the overall bank 
share  in  that  type  of  lending,  derived  from  the  Flow  of  Funds 
mortgage  tables. 
19 of about  24 percent  in the 1970s.  Market  share remained  at this 
ratio as recently  as the mid-1980s,  before  declining  to about  21 
percent  during  the 1992 to 1993 period  (Table 9).  Explaining  the 
recent decline  in bank market  share requires  consideration  of the 
essentially  separate markets  for business lending to borrowers who 
can, or cannot, readily access the capital markets  directly. 
Small-Business  Lendinq.  There  is  no  convenient  data  that 
categorizes  business  firms  according  to  their  access  to  capital 
markets.  There  are  two  reasonable  proxies  for  businesses  that 
cannot  readily access  capital markets.  One  is the Flow of Funds 
category I'Nonfarm,  noncorporate nonfinancial business."  Another is 
the data  on  small  manufacturing  firms  collected  by  the  Commerce 
Department.34  Both sets of data tell the same story.  First, these 
firms  rely  more  heavily  on  banks  for  financing  than  do  large 
corporations.  Second, banks market share of lending to small firms 
has been  increasing. 
The Flow of Funds proxy for small business  shows bank lending 
as a percentage  of total liabilities  increasing from 11 percent  in 
the  1950s  to 20 percent  as  the  1970s began,  to about  25 percent 
since the early 1980s  (Table 9).  The increase  in bank lending  to 
noncorporate  business  may  be  surprising  to some  readers.  It  is 
explained  largely  by  an  increase  in  banks'  commercial  mortgage 
lending to this sector  (Table 10). 
This ratio has exceeded banks'  share of lending to corporate 
business  since the late 1970s.  Similarly,  the Quarterly  Financial 
Renort  for Manufacturing,  Mining  and Trade Coroorations  published 
by the Commerce Department  shows that bank loans as a percentage  of 
total  liabilities  at year-end  1992  ranged  from  32 percent  to 42 
percent  for manufacturing  firms in the size categories  less  than 
$250 million  in  assets,  to  about  eight  percent  for  the  largest 
firms with  over  $1 billion  in assets.  The Commerce  figures also 
show  an  increase  since  1979  in  bank  share  of  lending  to  small 
manufacturing  firms of all size categories  (Table 11). 
The  important  role  of  banks  in  financing  small  business 
lending  is  consistent  with  the  recent  academic  theory  of  the 
banking  firm.  Most  recent  academic  discussions  of  banking  have 
described  the prototypical  bank borrower  as one who cannot access 
capital markets directly or can do so only at great cost.  This is 
due  to  the  difficulty  the  borrower  has  in  conveying  credible 
information  about  his  creditworthiness  to  other  market 
participants.  The existence  of these  "informational  asymmetries" 
is one  of  the  principle  reasons  for  the  existence  of  banks  and 
other financial  intermediaries. 
34  Ouarterlv  Financial  Reoort  for Manufacturing,  Mininq  and 
Trade Coroorations,  U.S. Department  of Commerce. 
20 By their nature,  loans  to these prototypical  bank  borrowers 
tend to be difficult  for markets  to value and therefore  illiquid. 
Since  banks  hold  a high  proportion  of  short-term  and  demandable 
liabilities  that  are  payable  at  par,  the  illiquidity  of  their 
assets makes  them subject  to deposit  runs.35  It has been  debated 
whether  the joint provision  of transactions  accounts  and  lending 
services  gave  banks  an  "informational  advantage"  in  lending  to 
small  business  borrowers  and  whether  such  an  advantage  still 
exists.36  The  role  of  deposit  insurance  in  giving  banks  a 
comparative  advantage  in lending to these borrowers  has been less 
discussed.  It is not clear whether uninsured  entities  could fund 
illiquid,  informationally  opaque loans at as low 
and with as little capital as banks do. 
an interest  cost 
It also is worth noting that banks' share of business  lending 
in  smaller  communities  is  further  enhanced  by  the  practice  of 
placing  local business  leaders on the banks' Boards of Directors. 
These Directors  often tend to be the banks' best loan customers. 
Lendins  to Larse Borrowers.  There are two reasonable proxies 
for the set of firms with ready access to the capital markets.  One 
of  these  is  the  Flow  of  Funds  category  l'Nonfinancial Corporate 
Business,t' and  the  other  is  the  Commerce  data  described  above. 
Both  sets  of data  show  large  firms  relying  less  on bank  lending 
than  small  firms.  The  Flow  of  Funds  data  show  bank  lending  to 
corporate  borrowers  falling  substantially  during  the 198Os,  from 
about 25 percent of liabilities to about 15 percent  (Table 9).  The 
Commerce data, on the other hand, show a slight increase from 1979 
to  1992  in  bank  lending  to  the  largest  manufacturing  firms 
surveyed.  On balance,  the weight  of evidence  seems  to  indicate 
bank lending to large corporate borrowers has declined  in the last 
ten years.  A recent Federal Reserve study on banks' role in small 
business  lending concluded that most of the recent decline in bank 
C&I  lending  is  attributable  to  l'paydowns of  loans  at  large 
institutions,  likely  associated  with  portfolio  restructuring  by 
midsized  and large corporate borrowers.1137 
A frequently advanced explanation  for the recent loss of bank 
market  share  in  lending  might  be  called  the  "technology  and 
competition  I1  hypothesis.  In this view, improvements in information 
technology and capital  markets efficiency have made it increasingly 
easy for business borrowers to access the capital markets  directly. 
This  hypothesis  is  compelling.  The  upfront  costs  of  issuing 
3'Diamond  and Dybvig  (1983) is a seminal  exposition  of these 
ideas. 
36  See,  e.g.,  Franklin Edwards  (19931, pp. 29-33. 
37  Board  of Governors  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System  (19931, 
p.7. 
21 securities has declined as a result of increased competition in the 
underwriting  market  and the development  of shelf registration,  as 
described  in  a  preceding  section.  Improvements  in  information 
technology have made storage and transmittal of credit information 
much  easier,  mitigating  the  informational  asymmetry  problems 
described  in  the  preceding  section.  And  most  important,  large 
firms do appear  to be relying more heavily  on the capital markets 
in recent years. 
To  the  extent  the  pricing  of  credit  is  mentioned  in  this 
story,  it is as a corollary  to the underlying  premise.  That  is, 
the  returns  to  bearing  business  credit  risk  are  said  to  be  in 
secular  decline,  ground  down  by  relentless  improvements  in 
technology  and market  efficiency. 
.  .  .  . at one time virtually all financial market 
participants  had to rely on banks to bear any 
significant  credit  risk;  with  limitations  on 
geographic entry by other banks, this reliance 
created  the  potential  for  economic  rents  to 
credit-risk  bearing.  Now,  for  many 
institutional  investors,  the capacity  to bear 
high-quality  credit  risk  is  an  essentially 
costless  byproduct  of the expansion  of their 
portfolios;  as a result, any rents to bearing 
high-quality  credit  risk  have  to  fall  or 
vanish.38 
It is unfortunate  that credit pricing  has not  received  more 
emphasis in the recent discussion  of banks' lending share, for the 
technology  and  competition  hypothesis  may  not  be  the  all- 
encompassing  theory  that it appears  to be.  First,  the assertion 
that the returns to bearing  high-quality  business  credit risk are 
in  decline  appears  incorrect.  Second,  the  hypothesis  cannot 
explain why bank loans to the corporate sector gradually  increased 
in  importance  from  the  1950s  through  the  mid-1970s,  and  again 
during  the early 1980s  (Table 9), while  corporate bonds decreased 
steadily  in importance until  the mid-1980s  (Table 12). 
One measure  of the market's  required return to bearing  long- 
term  credit  risk  is the yield  spread  between  corporate  bonds  of 
various credit ratings and a composite index of long-term Treasury 
bonds.  An  index of required returns for bearing short-term  credit 
risk is the spread between  the commercial paper  rate and the rate 
on 91-day Treasury  bills.  As shown  in Figure  6, risk premia  for 
both  corporate  bonds  and  commercial  paper  were  very  low  in  the 
early  196Os,  began  to  increase  in  the  late  196Os,  remained 
relatively  high  and  volatile  through  the  early  1980s  before 
declining during the 1980s.  Currently, risk premia  for commercial 
38  Cumming  (19921, p.43. 
22 paper are 
corporate 
the  same 
Moody's. 
about what they were 30 years ago, while risk premia  for 
bonds are greater now than they were then.  Essentially 
pattern  appears  for  debt  rated  AAA,  AA,  A  and  BBB  by 
This visual  impression  of the data  is supported  by a simple 
regression  of  each  risk  premium  against  time  or,  alternatively, 
against  time and  the index of leading  indicators  (to control  for 
the influence  of macroeconomic  conditions  on risk premia).39  The 
results  indicate  that over the period  1960 through  1993, there is 
no declining  time-trend  in the risk premium  either  for corporate 
bonds  or  commercial  paper.  This  should  not be  surprising.  The 
market in which high-quality  corporate debt instruments are traded 
and yields are determined  was probably  no less competitive  in the 
1960s than it is today. 
The  time-path  of  risk premia  is suggestive  of an  important 
role  for  the  pricing  of  bank  loans  in  driving  changes  in  bank 
lending to business.  The decision by businesses to fund themselves 
by bank loans or through the issuance of securities depends on the 
relative  prices  of  these  alternatives.  As  risk  premia  for 
marketable  debt increased from their early-1960s  levels, banks did 
not  increase  their prime  lending  rate  in step.  For example, AAA 
corporate bond yields increased from 4.68 percent in December  1965 
to  8.04 percent  at  the  end  of  the  first  quarter  of  1977,  a  336 
basis point increase.  During the same period, banks' average prime 
lending  rate  increased  from  4.92 percent  to  6.25 percent,  a  133 
basis point increase.  Thus, the prime rate went from being priced 
slightly  higher  than the AAA  rate to being priced  well below  it, 
making  bank  credit  more  attractive  relative  to  public  debt 
issuance.  During  this period,  corporate  businesses  continued  to 
rely more on bank debt  (Table 9) and less on corporate bonds  (Table 
12). 
A similar  story, in reverse,  can be told for the 1980s.  The 
AAA bond rate began a fairly steady ten-year decline in June, 1984 
from a level of 13.55 percent.  At that time, the prime rate was at 
12.60  percent.  Five years later, in June 1989, the AAA rate was at 
8.93 percent while the prime was at 11.50 percent.  This time, bank 
loan pricing  had gone from being much more attractive  than public 
debt  to much  less attractive.  During  this period,  the  share  of 
bank  loans  in corporate  business  liabilities  decreased  (Table 9) 
and reliance on corporate bonds  increased  (Table 12). 
Correlation  does  not  imply  causation,  but  these  timing 
coincidences  are  worthy  of  more  systematic  investigation.  For 
example,  the  prime  rate  is  a  potentially  inaccurate  measure  of 
actual  loan rates at a give time, and the results  of alternative 
39  See  Fama  (1986) for  a  discussion  of  the  determinants  of 
money market  default premiums. 
23 measures  of  loan  pricing  would  be  interesting.  In  the  above 
examples I chose the starting and ending dates carefully to make my 
case  as  convincing  as  possible;  the  results  of  a  more  serious 
econometric  investigation would be interesting.  Finally, if it is 
true that bank  loan rates  increased more  slowly  than market  bond 
yields  in the 1970s and decreased more slowly in the mid-  to late 
198Os, did this occur as a result of some form of profit-maximizing 
price stickiness,  or did it simply reflect an underpricing  of risk 
in  the  1970s  and  a belated  tightening  of  standards  in  the  late 
198Os? 
Securities  Underwritinq 
Sections  16,  20,  21  and  32 of the Banking  Act  of  1933 have 
become  known  as  the  Glass-Steagall  Act.  Sections  16  and  21 
prohibit  deposit-taking  institutions  from "issuing, underwriting, 
selling  or  distributing,  at  wholesale  or  retail,  or  through 
syndicate participation,  stocks, bonds, debentures, notes or other 
securities.tt40  Exceptions  to  this  prohibition  were  made  for 
obligations  of the U.S. government, government agencies, dormitory 
bonds,  and  the  general  obligations  of  states  and  political 
subdivisions.  Section 20 prohibits members of the Federal Reserve 
System  from affiliating  with a company engaged principally  in the 
"issue,  flotation,  underwriting,  public  sale  or  distribution  at 
wholesale  or retail or through syndicate participation  of stocks, 
bonds,  debentures,  notes  or  other  securities."  Section  32 
prohibits a member bank from having interlocking directorships with 
a firm  tVprincipally  engaged"  in securities underwriting. 
Depository  institutions  do  have  some  ways  of  entering  the 
securities  business.  The prohibition  on affiliations  of Sections 
20  and  32  does  not  extend  to  non-member  banks  or  savings 
associations.  Moreover, member banks' authority to affiliate with 
firms that are not "principally engaged" in the securities business 
was affirmed in 1988.  If these firms earn less than ten percent of 
their revenues from underwriting  securities, they are deemed by the 
Federal Reserve not to be  "primarily engaged"  in the underwriting 
business.  As  the  first  quarter  of  1993,  two  "Section  20 
subsidiaries"  of banking  organizations  were among the top 12 lead 
managers of corporate debt issuances, and the total market share of 
banking  affiliates  in  this  market  was  somewhat  less  than  five 
percent.41  The FDIC, the Comptroller  and the Federal Reserve  also 
have interpreted the Glass-Steagall Act to allow banks to engage in 
the private placement of securities.  Finally, commercial banks may 
engage in the underwriting  and distribution  of securities  outside 
the United  States. 
4o  Benston  (1990), p. 7. 
41Perlmuth,  1993, p-149. 
24 Conclusions 
As  financial  markets  become  more  efficient  and  information 
technology  improves,  financial services are being provided  in new 
ways.  Activities  that  formerly  were  performed  in  one  physical 
place  by  a  few  people--"the  bank  as  general  store"--  are  now 
provided  by  multiple  specialized  units  that  may  or  may  not  be 
within  the same corporate boundary.  This uncoupling  of financial 
activities, together with increased volatility of interest rates in 
the 1970s and certain deregulatory measures,  caused an increase in 
price  competition  that  required  difficult  adjustments  for 
traditional  financial  intermediaries.  In  life  insurance,  in 
securities and in banking, market pressures on traditional products 
led  to  the  rapid  growth  of  new  products,  and  subsequent 
difficulties  and consolidation. 
The  commercial  banking  industry  has  maintained  or  improved 
market  share  in  some  markets  and  lost  in  others.  On  balance, 
however, the industry's revenues and capital have declined relative 
to  its  competitors  since  1980.  The  alternatives  available  to 
savers have  steadily  driven up  the interest  cost of deposits  and 
reduced their importance as a savings vehicle.  Meanwhile, however, 
it appears  that banks  have not profited  from the growth  of these 
alternative  savings vehicles  to the extent they could have.  Banks 
were once the dominant players in pension fund management, but have 
lost this position, most likely due to a failure to match the level 
of customer service that mutual fund companies provide.  Banks have 
had the ability to perform most of the services required by mutual 
funds, including  the ability  to act as investment advisers,  since 
at  least  1981.  Available  data  on  administrator  and  advisor 
revenues, however, suggest banks have captured only a modest market 
share in these areas. 
Banks'  share  of funds advanced  to large  corporate  borrowers 
has declined for the past decade.  Part of this is due to a decline 
in the fixed costs of issuing securities  that is not likely to be 
reversed.  In part,  however,  the decline  may  be  influenced  by a 
decline  in  risk  premia  for  marketable  securities  that  history 
suggests will be reversed. 
Banks have been more successful in lending to small borrowers. 
Bank market  share  of funds advanced  to noncorporate  business  has 
increased  substantially  since the 1950s and even since the 1970s. 
This is due to increased bank mortgage  lending to these firms.  In 
consumer credit the trends are mixed.  The commercial bank share of 
home mortgage  originations  has increased over the last ten years, 
but  it  is  not  possible  to  tell  how  much.  Among  the  largest 
issuers,  however,  there  has  been  a  substantial  increase  in  the 
representation  of  companies  not  affiliated  with  depository 
institutions.  The bank and thrift share of mortgage  servicing  is 
also apparently  increasing.  In credit card lending, nonbank share 
25 is increasing among the largest issuers, but the business  is still 
dominated  by  banks.  For  overall  consumer  lending,  it  is  not 
possible  to determine  a meaningful  measure  of bank market  share, 
because of inadequate data on the holdings of asset backed security 
issuers. 
Banks  are  free  to  compete  in most  of  these markets  without 
substantial  regulatory  handicaps.  One  exception  is  banks' 
inability  to  affiliate  with  commercial  firms,  which  makes  it 
difficult  for  them  to  compete  with  captive  finance  companies  in 
automobile lending.  The other major exception is the set of limits 
on bank  securities  underwriting  activities.  The  debate  whether 
these  restrictions  should  be  relaxed  is,  of  course,  beyond  the 
scope of this paper. 
Even without any easing of restrictions on bank activities and 
affiliations,  I  do  not  believe  that  banking  organizations  must 
necessarily  suffer  further  declines  of  market  share.  Average 
deposit  interest rates are now comparable  to the yields  on short- 
term  Treasury  bills.  Since  deposit  insurance  gives  many  bank 
deposits  the  same  risk  profile  as  a  short-term  Treasury  bill, 
average deposit rates may not rise much beyond their current level 
relative  to Treasuries.  In terms of competing  for other forms of 
household  savings,  there is no regulatory  reason why banks  cannot 
performmost  of the activities required by pension funds and mutual 
funds. 
In considering  the role of banking  organizations  in serving 
the funding needs of large corporate borrowers,  there are several 
reasons  why  unrelieved  pessimism  may  be  unnecessary.  First, 
although banks do face substantial  regulatory  hurdles  in entering 
the  securities  business,  they  may  expand  this  business  through 
their  existing  Section  20  authorities,  through  the  offering  of 
private placements  of securities,  and by offshore underwritings. 
Second, it may be premature  to sound the death knell for bank 
lending  to corporate  borrowers.  Bank  loans grew more  attractive 
relative  to corporate  debt  in the  late  1960s  and  the  197Os,  and 
less attractive beginning in the mid-1980s.  Considering that there 
does not appear to be any secular decline in the returns to bearing 
high-quality  credit  risk,  it  is  reasonable  to  expect  that  the 
relative  price  of  marketable  debt  will  one  day  increase  again, 
increasing  the attractiveness  of bank loans. 
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*  Spread of Moody’s average corporate bond yield over a composite long-term Treasury rate, and of commercial paper rate
over 91 -day Treasury bill auction rate.
Source: Moody’s and the Federal Reserve BoardTable  1 
Households’  Use  of  Financial  Intermediaries 
1952  - 1993* 
Five  Year  1952-56  195741  1962-66  1967-71  1972-76  1977431  1982436  1987-91  1992-93 
Averages>  >  > 
Total  Household  Financial  923  1,273  1,720  2,436  3,346  5,547  8,852  13,327  16,482 
Asset  ($  Billions) 
Household  Financial  Assets  344.9%  368.0%  375.0%  364.5%  319.6%  313.1%  323.5%  352.1%  358.7% 
As  a  96 of  Disposable 
Personal  Income 
Share  of  Financial  Assets  30.3%  31.8%  35.6%  40.6%  47.9%  48.5%  54.0%  57.2%  58.7% 
Invested  through 
Intermediaries+ 
Share  of  Financial  Assets  69.7%  68.2%  64.4%  59.4%  52.1%  51.5%  46.0%  42.8%  41.3% 
Invested  Directly 
* Through  second  quarter  of  1993 
+  Sum  of  deposits,  investment  company  shares,  life  insurance  reserves,  pension  reserves,  and  bank  personal  trusts. 
Source:  Flow  of  Funds Year  -end 
1993  Number: 
Bank  Assets: 
Insured  Separate 
Commercial  Banking 
Banks  & TC’s  Organizations 
10,957 
3,705,947 
1990  Number:  12,343 
Bank  Assets:  3,389,465 
1985  Number:  14,407 
Bank  Assets:  2,730,672 
Table  2 




63,042  153  1.40 
1,163,398  31.39 
61,769  81  0.66  643  5.21 
863,491  25.48  1,908,281  56.30 
57,134  77  0.53  880  6.11 
734,553  26.90  1,412,183  51.72 
Sources:  FDIC  Research  Information  System  and  FRB  National  Information  Center  Databases 
Prepared  03/31/94  by FDIC  Division  of  Research  and  Statistics  (WSK) 
(Asset  figures  in $millions) 
Multi-Service  Banking  Organizations 
Domestic  10 Largest 
Offices  Banks/$  Percent  f  Banks/$  Percent 
640  5.84 
2,288,890  61.76 
50  Largest Table  3 
Percentage  Share  of  Total  Financial  Sector  Financial  Assets 
Five-Year  Averages 
1952-1993 
Finance  Companies 
Investment  Companies 
Security  Brokers  & 
Dealers 
ABS  Issuers 
Bank  Personal  Trusts 
Other 
3.8%  4.2%  4.6%  4.3%  4.3%  4.7%  4.6%  4.9%  4.4% 
2.3%  3.6%  4.2%  4.2%  2.6%  3.0%  6.1%  9.1%  12.3% 
1.3%  1.1%  1.1%  1.2%  1.0%  1.0%  1.8%  1.9%  2.7% 
0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.4%  1.9%  2.7% 
0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  4.9%  6.7%  5.1%  4.5%  4.2%  4.3% 
0.2%  0.3%  0.4%  0.6%  1.1%  0.6%  0.9%  0.8%  0.7% 
Total  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
Source:  Flow  of  Funds 
Table  4 
Distribution  of  Equity  Capital  for  Selected  Financial  Intermediaries 






195761  1962-a  1967-71  1972-76  197781  1982-86  1987-91 
47.9%  46.6%  48.5%  53.7%  51.3%  49.1%  41.7% 
17.4%  19.0%  18.1%  12.6%  11.1%  12.3%  14.6% 
23.4%  24.3%  21.2%  20.3%  24.6%  24.4%  26.0% 
11.4%  1  9.8%  1  11.2%  1  11.0%  1  10.4%  1  10.21r1298 
-0.1%  I  0.2%  I  I  I  I  I  1.0%  2.5%  2.6%  3.9%  4.9% 
Group  Total  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100% 







100% Table  5 
Percentage  Shares  of  Total  Household  Sector  Financial  Assets 
Five-Year  Averages 
1952-1993 
Total Financial Assets  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100% 
Source:  Flow  of Funds 
Table  6 
The  Growth  of Household  Liabilities 
1952  - 1993 
Five-Year  Averages 
FiveYear  Averages  > > >  195256  1957-61  19626  1967-71  1972-76  1977-81  1982-86  1987-91  1992-93 
Total Household Liabilities  122.8  201.0  315.2  452.2  707.1  1,295  .O  2,074.9  3,426.3  4,151.5 
($  Billions) 
Household Liabilities as  96 of 
Disposable Personal Income 
45.6%  58.0%  68.6%  67.5%  67.2%  73.2%  75.6%  90.5%  90.3% 
Mortgages  as a  96 of Household 
Liabilities 
58.6%  61.1%  60.4%  58.1%  57.7%  61.2%  60.5%  64.2%  67.0% 
Consumer Credit as a  % of Household 
Liabilities 
31.2%  28.0%  27.6%  28.3%  28.4%  25.8%  25.0%  22.6%  19.4% 
Other as a  46 of  Household Liabilities  10.2%  10.9%  12.0%  13.7%  13.8%  13.0%  14.5%  13.2%  13.6% 
Total  I  100.0%  I  100.0%  I  100.0%  I  100.0%  I  100.0%  I  100.0%  I  100.0%  I  100.0~ 
Source:  Flow  of  Funds Commercial  Banks 
l-4  Family 
1983  22.2% 
1993  24.9% 
Multifamilv 
1983  17.8% 
1993  61.1% 
Non-Residential 
1983  45.8% 
1993  81.5% 
Farm 
1983  29.3 % 
1993  75.0% 
Table 7 
Mortgage  Originations 
1983-1993 
Savines Banks  S&Ls  Mortgage  Comnanies 
5.3%  40.4%  29.6% 
8.3%  17.5 %  53.1% 
10.2%  43.1%  3% 
3.1%  22.3%  0% 
2.9%  22.1%  5.0% 










Source:  The  Mortgage  Market  Statistical  Annual  for  1994 
Table  8 
Percentage  Shares  of Total  Consumer  Credit 
Five-Year  Averages 
* ABS  refers  to  asset-backed  securities. 
Source:  Flow  of  Funds Table  9 
Funds  Advanced  by  Banks  to  Nonfinancial  Business 
1952-1993 
Five  Year  Averages 
FiveYear  Averages  >  >  >  1952-56  1957.61  196266  1967-71  1972-76  1977-81  w82-86  1987-91  1992-93 
Nonfinancial  Business  204.4  285.3  413.1  658.2  1,090.l  1,879.8  3,190.l  4,876.4  $305.0 
Liabilities  ($ Billions) 
Share  of  Bank  Loans* 
Nonfarm  Noncorporate 
Liabilities  ($ Billions) 
Share  of  Bank  Loans* 
Nonfinancial  Corporate 
Liabiities  (S Billions) 
17.5%  18.2%  19.9%  22.0%  22.9%  21.9%  22.9%  21.6%  19.3% 
26.3  36.2  51.7  95.5  230.7  453.6  925.2  1,388.4  1,407.5 
11.1%  11.8%  13.4%  17.4%  21.3%  24.8%  25.0%  26.3  %  25.4% 
162.2  226.0  325.6  511.9  776.9  1,267.S  2,071.2  3,339.S  3,748.3 
Share  of  Bank  Loans*  17.3%  18.1%  19.8%  21.8%  21.8%  19.3%  20.6%  18.3%  15.7% 
*  Includes  estimated  commercial  bank  share  of  mortgage  lending  to  businesses. 
Source:  Flow  of  Funds 
Table 10 
Bank  Lending  to  Noncorporate  Business1 
As  a Percentage  of Noncorporate  Business  Liabilities 
1952-1993 
Five  Year  Averages 
‘Noncorporate,  nonfarm,  nonfinancial  business. 
W=ctor’s  mortgage  debt,  multipled  by  the  percentage  share  of  commercial  banks  in  each  type  of  mortgage. 
* Estimated  by  the  Flow  of  Funds  to  be  negligible. 
Source:  Estimates  based  on  Flow  of  Funds Table  11 
Bank  Lending  to  Manufacturing  Firms 
1979-  1992 
Asset  Size  in  Millions 
less  than  5  s-10  10-2s 
greater 
25-50  so-  100  loo-250  250  -  1000  than  IB 
1979 
Bank  Share  of 
Total  Liabilities  29.62%  31.91%  33.61%  27.70%  26.36%  20.43%  14.27%  6.54% 
1992 
Bank  Share  of 
Total  Liabilities  33.36%  36.77%  41.74%  38.66%  36.88%  32.23%  26.81%  8.43% 
Source:  Quarterly  Financial Report  For  Manufacturing,  Mining, and Trade  Corporrations.  U.S.  Department  of  Commerce 
Table  12 
Nonfinancial  Corporate  Business 
Reliance  on  Marketable  Debt 
Five-Year  Averages  >  >  >  1952-56  195741  1962.66  1967-71  1972-76  1977-81  1982-86  198731  1992-93 
Tote1 Liabilities (S Billions)  204.4  285.3  413.1  658.2  1,090.l  1,879.a  3,190.l  4J76.4  5.305.0 
Corporate  Bonds es e  % of 
Liabilities 
25.1%  25.5%  22.9%  23.0%  21.3%  18.5%  16.5%  19.3%  22.1% 
Commercial  Paper ss  s  % of 
Liabilities 
0.2%  0.2%  0.3%  0.8%  0.9%  1.3%  1.7%  2.0%  2.2% 
Source:  Flow of Funds 